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I<~eb. 1955] SPARKS v. HEDINGER 
[44 C.2d 121; 279 P.2d 971] 
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F. No. 19120. In Bank. Feb. 21, 1955.] 
CHARLES K. SPARKS et al., Respondents, v. JOHN 
AUGUST REDINGER et al., Appellants. 
[ S. P. No. 19119. In Bank. Feb. 21, 19.55.] 
GARTH S. THOMAS, Respondent, v. JOHN AUGUST 
REDINGER et al., Appellants. 
[1] New Trial-Errors Relating to Instructions.-Where trial court 
grants new trial on ground of error in instructions, its con-
clusion, in exercise of wide discretion, will not ordinarily be 
disturbed. 
[2] Appeal-Presumptions-Orders on Motion for New TriaL-
On appeal from order granting new trial, all presumptions are 
in favor of order as against verdict, and order will be affirmed 
if it may be sustained on any reasonable view of record. 
[3] New Trial-Errors in Law.-Trial court is expressly enjoined 
by Const., art. VI, § 4lh, from granting new trial for error 
of law unless such error is prejudicial, and if it clearly appears 
that error could not have affected result of trial, court is bound 
to deny motion. 
[ 4a, 4b] Automobiles-Appeal- Harmless Error- Instructions-
Last Clear Chance.-In action for personal injuries arising 
from collision when automobile made left turn into path of 
tractor, wherein tractor owner cross-complained against auto-
mobile driver and jury was instructed to bring in verdict for 
tractor owner if it found that automobile driver was negligent 
in operation of automobile, that such negligence proximately 
contributed to damages sustained by tractor owner, and that 
tractor driver was free from negligence in operation of his 
Yehicle, failure to give last clear chance instruction did not 
constitute prejudicial error where jury found that tractor 
driver was not guilty of any negligence proximately contribut-
ing to accident, since last clear chance doctrine presupposes 
negligence on part of both parties. 
[5] Negligence-Last Clear Chance.-Last clear chance doctrine 
[1] See Cal.Jur., New Trial, § 92 et seq.; Am.Jur., New Trial, 
§ 117 et seq. 
[ 4] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 80 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negligence, 
§ 215 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] New Trial, § 124; [2] Appeal and 
Error, §1197; [3] New Trial, §117; [4] Automobiles, §385-10; 
[5-7] Negligence, § 46. 
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such party was guilty of contributing 
to happening of must also find that all other 
necessary elements of last clear chance doctrine were 
[6] Id.-Last Clear purpose of last clear ehance 
negligence is 
from of 
will bar his recovery when 
it may be said that such 
rather than cause of 
[7] !d.-Last Clear Chance.-Last clear chance doctrine is but 
phase of doctrine of proximate cause in its relation to negli-
gence of injured party who seeks to invoke it, and can have no 
possible application where it appEars thnt party 
sought to be charged is not guilty of any negligence which 
proximately contributes to happening of accident. 
APPEAI-'S from orders of tlw Superior Court of Alameda 
County granting new trials. Thomas J. Ledwich, Judge. 
Reversed. 
Actions for damages for personal injuries and property 
damage arising out of collision of vehicles. Orders granting 
plaintiffs new trials, reversed. 
Keith, Creede & Sedgwick, Cresswell & Davis and Scott 
Conley for Appellants. 
,James G. Quinn, Jr., William H. Quinn and Cyril Viadro 
for Respondents. 
SPENCE, J.-Plaintiffs were injured in a collision when 
their automobile, while making a left-hand turn at a highway 
intersection, was struck by an oncoming tractor, pulling two 
gravel-loaded trailers. Plaintiffs brought actions against 
Homen, owner of the tractor, and his employee, Redinger, 
the driver. Homen cross-complained against the plaintiff 
driver of the automobile, Charles K. Sparks, for damages to 
his equipment. All actions were consolidated for trial. The 
jury returned Yerdicts against all three plaintiffs on their 
complaints and a verdirt in favor of Homen ou his cross-
complaint. Plaintiffs moved for a new trial. 'l'he court 
granted their motions on the sole ground that it had erred 
in failing· to give plaintiffs' propose(1 instruction on the doc-
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a new 
a new trial on the ground 
in the exercise of 
be disturbed. (Hunton 
Portland Cement 50 Cal.App.2d 684, 69:) 
\123 P.2d 947] Barnett 93 Cal.App.2d 553, 557 
! 209 P.2d . ) [2] All presumptions favor the order as 
the verdict v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 25 
Cal.2c! 165, 169 [153 P.2d 338]), and the order will be affirmed 
if it ma~· br :mstaim;d on any rcascmable view of the record. 
(Ballar-'cl v. 28 Cal.2d 357, 358 [170 
. ) But the trial court, no less than the 
is expressly enjoined by article- VI, section 
of onr Constitution from granting a new trial for error 
of law unlrss such error is prejudicial. If it clearly appear.,; 
that the error could not have affected the result of the trial, 
the court is bound to deny the motion. (Brown v. George 
Foundation, 23 Cal.2d 256, 262 [143 P.2d 929] .) 
[4a.] Here the record affirmatively shows that the failure 
to give the proposed last clear ehancc instruction did not 
eonstitute prejudicial error, and that the trial court erred in 
so holding. Accordingly, the orders granting plaintiffs a 
new trial must be reversed. 
For thr purpose of this discussion, it will be assumed that 
there was sufficient evidence relating to the happening of the 
accident to have warranted the giving of a last clear chance 
instruction. (Daniels v. City & County of San Franc·isco, 
40 Cal.2d 614, 623 [255 P.2d 785]; Sills v. Los Angeles Transit 
Lines, 40 Cal.2d 630, 633 [255 P.2d 795] .) Apart from the 
failure of the court to instruct on this doctrine, no complaint 
is made of any of thr instructions. The jury was otherwise 
proprrly instructed on negligence, contributory negligence, 
and proximate eause. 
The same main issues >vere presented by the pleadings with 
respeet to plaintiffs' complaints and defendant Homen's cross-
complaint. Under the instructions given, the jury could 
only have returned a verdict in favor of Homen on his cross-
complaint in the e\'rllt that it found that Redinger, the driver 
of Homen's tractor, \vas not guilty of any negligence which 
proximately eontributrd to the happening of the accident. 
'rhus, the jury was expressly instructed: ''If you find that 
the cross-defendant Charles Sparks was negligent in the oper-
ation of his automobile and that such negligence proximately 
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<:outributed to the damages sustained by the cross-complainant 
Homen, and that the defendant John Hedinger was free from 
any negligence in the operation of the truck owned by cross-
complainant Homen, then you must find a verdict in favor 
of cross-complainant Homen. However, any negligence on 
the part of cross-complainant's employee, John Redinger, 
which proximately contributed to the accident in question will 
bar a recovery for the cross-complainant." 
In view of these instructions and the jury's verdict in favor 
of Homen on the cross-complaint, it necessarily follows that 
the failure to give the last clear chance instruction did not 
prejudice plaintiffs' cause, for the doctrine presupposes neg-
ligence on the part of both parties. (19 Cal.Jur., Negligence, 
§ 80, pp. 651-652.) Accordingly, when the jury, as here, 
necessarily found that the defendant driver was not guilty 
of any negligence proximately contributing to the accident, 
there was no place for the jury's application of the last clear 
chance principles. 
Plaintiffs argue that negligence "may consist of the failure 
to avoid an accident under the last clear chance doctrine"; 
and where the jury is not instructed on that subject in a 
proper case, it might find a party free from negligence, but 
if it were instructed on the subject it might find the same 
party guilty of negligence in that he had the last clear chance 
to avoid the accident and failed to exercise ordinary care 
to do so. [5] However, plaintiffs' argument is based upon 
the erroneous theory that the last clear chance doctrine 
changes the rules for the determination of the issue of negli-
gence on the part of the respective parties. Such is not the 
case, as those rules remain precisely the same; and in order 
to impose liability upon a party under the last clear chance 
doctrine, the jury must find not only that such party was 
guilty of negligence proximately contributing to the happen-
ing of the accident, but must also find that all other necessary 
elements of the last clear chance doctrine were present. 
[6] The only purpose of the last clear chance doctrine is 
to relieve the injured party from the rigid application of 
the rule that contributory negligence will bar his recovery, 
when the circumstances are such that it may be said that such 
party's negligence is a remote, rather than a proximate, cause 
of his injuries. (Girdner v. Union Oil Co., 216 Cal. 197, 
201-204 [13 P.2d 915]; Center v. Yellow Cab Co., 216 Cal. 
205, 207-208 [13 P.2d 9181.) [7] In other words, the last 
clear chance doctrine is but a "phase of the doctrine of 
Feb. 1955] SPARKS v. REDINGER 
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proximate cause" in its relation to the negligence of the 
injured party who seeks to invoke it. (See annos. : 92 .A.L.R. 
47; 119 .A.L.R. 1041; 171 .A.L.R. 365.) It is therefore entirely 
clear that the last clear chance doctrine can have no possible 
application where it affirmatively appears that the party 
sought to be charged is not guilty of any negligence which 
proximately contributes to the happening of the accident. 
[4b] The jury was fully instructed that plaintiffs were 
entitled to a verdict if it should find that the defendant driver 
was chargeable with any negligence in the operation of his 
truck that proximately contributed to plaintiffs' injuries, and 
that "contributory negligence is of no importance unless it 
is a proximate cause of the accident." (See Gillette v. City 
of San Francisco, 58 Oal..App.2d 434, 441 [136 P.2d 611] ; 
Simon v. City & County of San Francisco, 79 Cal..App.2d 590, 
600 [ 180 P .2d 393].) Moreover, the instructions were in 
fact more stringent than even the last clear chance doctrine 
in their application to the issue of Redinger's alleged negli-
gence. 'rhey recited his duty to use ordinary care in the 
face of another's negligence which ''in the exercise of ordinary 
care would be apparent to him," while the last clear chance 
instruction only applies in the event of actual knowledge of 
another's perilous position. (Daniels v. City & County of 
San Francisco, supm, 40 Oal.2d 614, 619; Sills v. Los Angeles 
Transit Lines, supra, 40 Cal.2d 630, 637.) In view of such 
broad instructions and the jury's return of a verdict in favor 
of the cross-complainant Homen, which only could be based 
on a finding that Redinger was not guilty of any negligence 
wl1ich proximately contributed to the accident, it is clear that 
the giving of the last clear chance instruction could not have 
changed the result, and the error, in failing to give it, was 
not prejudicial. 
The present situation, in which the verdict for the cross-
complainant Homen could only rest on a finding that his 
driver Redinger was free from negligence proximately con-
tributing to the accident, is distinguishable from the cases 
cited by plaintiffs, where there was simply a verdict against 
a plaintiff on his complaint. (Daniels v. City &: County of 
San Francisco, supra, 40 Cal.2d 614; Sills v. Los Angeles 
Transit Lines, supra, 40 Cal.2d 630.) In these cited cases 
the reviewing court could not tell whether the verdict in 
favor of defendant was based on a finding that defendant 
'Was not negligent or that plaintiff was negligent, in which 
latter event a last clear chance instruction might have avoided 
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that factor as a proximate cause recovery. Accord-
ingly, in those cases, the failure to instruct on the doctrine 
of last clear chance was deemed In the present 
case, there is no room for doubt as to the basis for the ver-
dict, as the record shows that it was necessarily 
based on the that defendant and cross-com-
plainant Homen's driver was 
gence 
dent. 
The orders a new trial are reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
CAR'l'ER, J.-I dissent. 
and 
This is another last clear chance case that adds to the 
confusion in this field. The majority opinion erroneously 
states that the doctrine presupposes negligence by both plain-
tiff and defendant and then holds that instructions on negli-
gence gave the jury a clear picture of the circumstances under 
which the jury could find defendant driver of the truck, 
negligent under the last clear chance doctrine. 
On the first proposition, the majority opinion states : ''. . . 
the doctrine presupposes negligence on the part of both 
parties.'' And: ''Plaintiffs argue that negligence 'may con-
sist of the failure to avoid an accident under the last clear 
chance doctrine'; and where the is not instructed on 
that subject in a proper case, it might find a party free from 
negligence, but if it were instructed on the subject it might 
find the same party guilty of negligence in that he had the 
last clear chance to avoid the accident and failed to exercise 
ordinary care to do so. However, is based 
upon the erroneous theory that the last clear chance doctrine 
changes the rules for the determination of the issue of negli-
gence on the part of the respective parties. Such is not 
the case, as those rules remain precisely the same; and in 
order to impose liability upon a party under the last clear 
chance doctrine, the jury must find not only that such party 
was guilty of negligence proximately contributing to the 
happening of the accident, but must also find that all other 
necessary elements of the last clear ehance doctrine were 
present.'' 
It is not the law that under the doctrine of last clear 
chance negligence of defendant is ''presupposed'' or that 
Feb. SPARKS v. HEDINGER 
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the• to do with form-
a basis for defendant's It is well settled 
that under this doctrine there may have been no antecedent 
on defendant's His negligence may arise 
solely from his conduct after a situation is presented in which 
he must use care to avoid the accident, because he has the 
last clear chance to do so, even though he was not negligent 
to that time. Therefore the jury should be instructed 
on the doctrine or its to permit it to determine 
whether defendant •vas negligent in the light of the situa-
tion confronting him. 'fhe question is ably discussed : ''But 
last clear chance cases are not so simple; the difference be-
tween the m·iginal and the final negligence of the parties must 
be taken into account. The plaintiff must be guilty of some 
original negligence by which he places himself in a position 
of danger; and the defendant, seeing plaintiff in such danger, 
must be guilty of some final negligence which proximately 
causes the injury. And if, at the last moment, either party 
can avoid the accident by the exercise of ordinary care, the 
law then disregards his prior misconduct, and deals with his 
behavior at the time the injury is done. In this event, the 
prior misconduct is said to be the cause of the danger, and 
the later misconduct the cause of the injury .... 
"In last clear chance cases, the original negligence of the 
injured party il1 himself into a position of peril, is 
merely an attendant cond-ition, and not the proximate cause 
of the injury, ... and the final negligence of the defendant, 
after discovering plaintiff in a position of danger, is a new 
and independent negligence, and the proximate cause of 
the injury.'' 
''Let us sketchily repeat those special conditions: first, 
that the plaintiff has been guilty of original negligence of 
some kind ; second, that by reason of such original negligence 
he, the plaintiff, is in a position of danger; . . . fourth, that 
the defendant then haR an opportunity to avoid injuring the 
plaintiff, by exercising ordinary care under the circumstances; 
and fifth, that the defendant fails to exercise such ordinary 
care, or in other words, is guilty of some final negligence. 
"That is to say, the defendant's duty under the last clear 
chance doctrine, to exercise final care [emphasis added] to 
avoid the accident, does not arise until he discovers plaintiff 
in a position of danger .... But even if he was guilty of 
original negligence, that fact alone will not make him liable 
under the last clear chance doctrine; for just as plaintiff's 
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original negligence is merely an attendant condit·ion, and 
not the proximate cause, of the injury, ... so, on principle, 
it would seem that defendant's original negligence should 
likewise be considered an attendant condition, and not the 
proximate cause, under the last clear chance doctrine. As 
soon, however, as defendant discovers plaintiff in a position 
of danger, he is then bound to exercise ordinary care to 
avoid the accident; and if, under all the circumstances, he 
does exercise such ordinary care, he is not liable; but if, 
under all the circumstances, he fails to use ordinary care 
from that time on, he may be held guilty of final negligence 
[emphasis added], and the plaintiff may invoke the doctrine. 
It then becomes the function of the court or jury to determine 
whether or not, under all the circumstances, the defendant, 
after discovering plaintiff in a position of danger, was guilty 
of such final negligence [emphasis added]." 
''One says that the antecedent negligence of one or both 
parties is immaterial; that 'the law deals with their behavior 
in the situation in which it finds them at the time the mischief 
is done, regardless of their prior misconduct'; and that the 
prior misconduct is the cause of the danger only, while it is 
the later misconduct that is the cause of the injury." (Hall, 
Last Clear Chance, pp. 4, 82, 212.) 
While some of the older cases said that for the doctrine 
to apply defendant's negligence is presupposed (see cases 
collected 19 Cal.Jur. 651-652) other cases and recent ones 
have pointed out that defendant's negligence, and hence lia-
bility, may arise from his conduct after the last clear chance 
situation is presented to him, the proposition being stated in 
the language that plaintiff's negligence is remote and the 
proximate cause of the injury is defendant's negligence in 
failing to avert the injury. It is stated in Doherty v. Cali-
fornia Nav. & Imp. Co., 6 Cal.App. 131, 137 [91 P. 419], 
quoting from Wheeler v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Canada, 
70 N.H. 607 [50 A. 103, 54 L.R.A. 955] : " 'If due care on 
the part of either at the time of the injury would prevent 
it, the antecedent negligence of one or both parties is im-
material except it may be as one of the circumstances by 
which the requisite measure of care is to be determined. In 
such a case the law deals with their behavior in the situa-
tion in which it finds them at the time the mischief is done, 
regardless of their prior misconduct. The latter . . . is the 
cause of the danger, the former is the cause of the injury. 
' " In Sills v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 40 Cal.2d 630, 
Peb. 129 
the 
same." [215 
P .2d himself 
111 a escape by 
the exercise of care, that defendant knew of the 
boy's that she had the last clear chance to avoid the 
accident the exercise 
and that the was killed as a 
" added.) 'I' his court said in (} irdncr v. 
Union Oil Co., 216 Cal. 197, 200 [13 P.2d 915] : " ... estab-
lished the fact that when plaintiff and was pro-
ceeding across the path of the oil truck, and up to the time 
of the collision, he did not see and was totally oblivious of 
the approach of the and the that confronted 
him; that defendant Elam first saw plaintiff's car some forty 
or fifty feet away from the intersection; that he saw plaintiff 
looking straight ahead, in an opposite and not 
slowing the speed of his automobile; that Elam was traveling 
at a speed of twenty miles an hour and could have stopped 
his truck almost immediately, and within a distance of a few 
feet; that he had ample time and sufficient distance, at least 
twenty-five to thirty-five feet, in which to stop and avoid 
coming in contact with plaintiff's car, but failed to do so." 
'"rhe real issue in cases of the character here involved is not 
whose negligence came first or last, but whose negligence, 
however it came, was the proximate cause of the injury .... 
''If defendant is not able to avoid injuring plaintiff in 
the exercise of ordinary care, the plaintiff's original negli-
gence continues to be the proximate cause of his own injury, 
which bars recoYery. If, on the other hand, defendant is 
able to avoid injuring the negligent plaintiff and negligently 
fails to do so, plaintiff's origiual though nc:gligence 
only remotely contributes to the injury and is not the proxi-
mate cause thereof, and hence the applied doctrine, by its own 
principles, establishes the right of plaintiff to recover not-
withstanding the fact that his original negligence would, by 
its continuing nature, bar a recovery if the doctrine were not 
applicable." (Emphasis added; Girdner v. Um:on Oil Co., 
supra, pp. 201-202, 203.) Similarly in Center v. Yellow Cab 
Co., 216 Cal. 205, 208 [13 P.2d 918], it was said: "If the 
44 C.2d-5 
1:30 SPAHK::; /'. HEDIXGEH C.2d 
elements of the last (·lear cha11ce doctrine are 
tiH' doctrine appli('N, the (•onl 
injured is not the proximate cause, as the 
led er, constitutes the sole proximate cause.'' 
(Emphasis added.) In Daniels v. &; San 
]i'rancisco, 40 Cal.2d 614 P.2d , and the Sills, Bone-
brake, Girdner and Center cases there was no antecedent 
negligence on defendant's part. The sole negligence with 
respect to him was his conduct after being with a 
last clear chance situation. 
The majority uses the fallacious premise above discussed 
to conclude that since plaintiff lost on the cross-eomplaint, and 
there were adequate instructions on the subject of defendant's 
duty after he was confronted with the plaintiff's perilous 
position, the failure to give an instruction on last clear 
chance was not prejudicial error. '!'hose instructions did not 
embody the elements of last clear ehance; they did not advise 
the jury that if defendant could have avoided injuring 
plaintiff by the exercise of ordinary care after discovering 
plaintiff's peril then plaintiff could recover. Certainly plain-
tiff was entitled to have his theory of liability presented to 
the jury with respect to his ease regardless of tlw eross-
complaint. Daniels v. City&; County of San Francisco, sttpra, 
40 Cal.2d 614, and Sills v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, sttpra, 
40 Cal.2d 630, contrary to the majority opinion, are clearly 
applicable and show that the instructions given did not cure 
the error in refusing the last elear chance instruction. In 
the Daniels case it is said: "Defendants submit that even 
though the court erroneously refused to instruct on the last 
clear chance doctrine, nevertheless no prejudice resulted to 
plaintiffs because ( 1) the doctr·ine was covered by other in-
structions given by the court and (2) the verdict of 
the jnry imports findings ·in favor of defendants on all material 
issues so as to preclude plaintiffs from raising an objection 
based on tl!at theory of 1·ecovrry. Neither point is well 
taken. 
"The instructions cited by defendants in nowise purported 
to include the elements of the last clear chance doctrine. 
Hather they vvere directed only to the duty of the bus driver 
to 'use reasonable prudence in analyzing the . . . situation' 
confronting him so as to avoid colliding with plaintiffs' auto-
mobile. Moreover, the court in its other instructions plainly 
refuted any application of the last clear chance doctrine by 
e.harging the jury that any negligence on the part of either 
Feb. SPARKS v. REDINGER 
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Mrs. Daniels or her guest, Mrs. Smith, would bar a recovery, 
a necessar~' tenet of the doctrine is the presence of 
the plaintiff's negligence. l Citations.] It is the duty of the 
court to instruct on every theory of the case firiding support 
in the evidence." (Emphasis added.) In the Sills case, it 
is said : ''Defendants finally contend that even though it was 
for the trial court to have refused the requested 
instruction on the last clear chance doctrine, such refusal 
was not prejudicial error. In support of their position, de-
fendants urge that every major 0lement of that doctrine was 
covered other instructions. Two of the cited instructions 
concerned proximate cause, one being the usual definition 
thereof and the other referring to a 'violation of law' as 'of 
no consequence unless it was a proximate cause' of the in-
The third cited instruction was a lengthy declara-
tion of the law relating to the right-of-way at an intersection, 
and the duty to exercise ordinary care so as to avoid a colli-
sion. Manif0stly, such instructions did not purport to deal 
with the last clear chance doctrine and cannot be deemed 
adequate for submitting to the jury the question of defend-
ants' liability upon that theory. Moreover, at defendants' 
request the jury was expressly charged, without qualifica-
tion, that contributory negligence would bar a recovery, and 
no declaration was made covering plaintiff's theory of his 
right to prevail under the last clear chance doctrine. [ Cita-
tion.] In these circumstances defendants unavailingly argue 
the proposition that the erroneously refused instruction should 
not be deemed prejudicial because the principle therein stated 
~was fully and fairly covered in other instructions to the jury.'' 
(Sills v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, supra, 40 Cal.2d 630, 639.) 
The majority opinion holds, in effect, that any time the de-
fendant filE's a cross-complaint plaintiff is not entitled to a 
last clear chance instruction although the facts justify it. 
No authority is cited for that proposition and I believe there 
is none. There is no basis for it. 
T wonJd, th0refore, affirm the orders granting a new trial. 
HE>spolldents' petition for a rE'hE'aring' "·as denie<l Mareh 
;!,2, ]!););). Carter, .T., was of the opillion that the p0tition 
should be granted. 
